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I. Introduction
Especially since the late 1980s, analysts have channeled a great amount 
of effort into research on regional security cooperation in East Asia. Some 
emphasize material factors such as state interests in economic development, 
whereas others underline ideational forces such as norms, culture, and identity. 
Still, while some stress external factors like balance of power, others highlight 
internal factors such as domestic political legitimacy. In short, scholars have 
identified so many factors that are influential in East Asian regionalism. 
James Nolt, for example, raises six obstacles to regional multilateral security 
cooperation: historical animosities, asymmetries in political and economic 
systems, limited economic interdependence, the U.S. tendency toward 
bilateralism, lingering tendencies to isolate China, and national differences in 
human rights conception and practice (Nolt, 1999, pp.96-100).
However, there is no consensus as to which factor(s) assume(s) most 
powerful influence on security regionalism in East Asia. What are the principal 
forces that are determining the dynamism of regional security cooperation in this 
part of the world? Is it the stable distribution of power? Is it leadership of great 
powers? Is it historical animosities that are rooted in colonial experience during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Is it lingering, unresolved territorial 
disputes? Is it the diversity of regional countries in terms of political and 
economic systems, ethnicity, culture, language, and religion? Or are East Asian 
states inherently incompatible with the idea of regionalism and multilateralism? 
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If the answer is the last one, then there is little we can do to promote regional 
security cooperation. Its effectiveness will be intrinsically limited. But if the 
answer is historical animosities or the diversity of the region, for example, 
policy priorities to facilitate regional cooperation become much clearer. 
There is a dearth of research shedding light to this question in the work 
of regionalism in general and East Asian regionalism in particular. As Edward 
Mansfield and Helen Milner argue, “recent research leaves various important 
theoretical and empirical issues unresolved, including which political factors 
bear most heavily on regionalism and the nature of their effects” (Mansfield and 
Milner, 1999, p.590). This article thus advocates that a lot more scholarly focus 
must be given to research on the relative potency of the identified and still-to-
be identified factors. The reason is simple. Mere identification of influential 
forces—i.e. stating that ‘they all matter to regionalism’—does not serve to 
render a useful policy guide. Since there are always priorities in foreign and 
security policies and state resources (time, money, personnel, etc.) are limited, 
it is important to weigh their relative influence in order to help provide the best 
guide for policy in fostering regional security cooperation. 
The objective of this article is two-fold. First is to present five factors 
among various influences, which are considered as paramount importance 
in shaping overall East Asian international relations in general and forming 
regionalism in particular. Second, the author suggests another influence and 
elaborates on this sixth factor. 
II. Five Factors
Because of limited paper space, the author addresses five factors that are 
of particular importance. They are balance of power, historical animosities, 
economic development, norms of sovereignty and domestic non-intervention, 
and domestic political legitimacy. 
1. Balance of Power
Avery Goldstein observes that power balancing represents the most 
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fundamental pattern defining East Asian security order (Goldstein, 2003, p.171). 
Several prominent scholars point out the importance of balance of power in 
regional cooperation in this region. The Late Michael Leifer, for example, argued 
that “the prior existence of a stable balance of power” is the “prerequisite” for 
the success of regional security institutions such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) (Leifer, 1996, p.57). Without 
it, Leifer continued, regional security institutions would be “bricks made without 
straw” (Leifer, 1996, p.59). G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama also argue 
that the balance of power is “one of the critical forces” for fostering regionalism 
and multilateralism in the region (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama, 2002, p.82).
The importance of the balance of power is illustrated in the process of 
establishing the ARF. Perhaps the most important regional security concern in 
post-Cold War East Asia was the possibility of a power vacuum. The end of the 
superpower rivalry and the collapse of the Soviet Union made the U.S. forward 
presence in the region no longer indispensable. The U.S. presence was generally 
welcomed throughout the region as a counterweight against the emergence of 
two regional powers, China and Japan. When the U.S. withdrew its forces from 
Subic Bay and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 1991-1992, apprehensions 
that the U.S. withdrawal would tilt the regional balance of power by triggering 
competition between China and Japan to fill the vacuum heightened. 
One of the priorities for ASEAN was the maintenance of a regional 
balance of power via engagement of the U.S. and China. This became a primary 
incentive in the establishment of the ARF (Emmers, 2001, pp.275-91; Leifer, 
1996, pp.5-20; Morimoto, 1994, pp.26-9; Nishihara, 1994, pp.60-74). A stable 
distribution of power was necessary for ASEAN to retain its diplomatic leverage 
to reassert itself and have its voices heard in its dealings with major powers. 
Power-balancing considerations thus played a significant role in the minds of the 
ASEAN leaders. Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar stated in 1996 that 
the issue for ASEAN was “how to maintain a stable balance of the major powers 
at a time of immense fluidity” (Jayasankaran, 1996, p.18). 
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2. Historical Animosities
Many East Asian countries are still fettered by bitter memories of the 
history of Western and Japanese imperialism and colonialism. Virtually every 
work on East Asian security raises this factor as one of the significant barriers 
to regionalism in East Asia (Buzan and Segal, 1994, pp.3-21; Christensen, 
1999, pp.49-80; Duffield, 2003, pp.254-62; Foot, 1995, pp.231-4; Friedberg, 
1993/94, pp.5-33). Lee Jong Won argues that historically generated mistrust and 
antagonism is a fundamental stumbling block against East Asian regionalism 
(Lee, 2004, p.3). The resentment is especially strong against Japan. Japan’s 
brutal behavior before and during the Second World War “erected unusually 
high obstacles” to regional cooperation (Duffield, 2003, p.254). To begin 
with, in the post-war era the U.S. intended to establish a multilateral Pacific 
Collective Security Organization through a Pacific Pact, which Japan was 
expected to join along with Korea, China, and other East Asian states (Hosoya, 
1984, pp.181-205). The pact did not come to fruition because many prospective 
members of the pact “have memories of Japanese aggression which are so vivid 
that they are reluctant to create a Mutual Security Pact which will include Japan” 
(Dulles, 1952, p.182). 
The resentment against Japan is muted in most Southeast Asian countries, 
but it remains strong in China and Korea. Historical animosities have frequently 
been raised as a primary impediment to cooperation between Japan and China 
and Japan and South Korea (Cha, 1999, pp.19-23). From the perspective of 
China, “the residue of animosity and distrust toward Japan, and to a lesser 
degree, toward the West means that Chinese have little faith in [regionalism]
…Not surprisingly, the more a nation nurses a grievance about historical 
humiliations, the less accepting it will be of multilateral cooperation involving 
the powers responsible for that humiliation” (Rozman, 1998, p.114).
Although deep distrust rooted in historical animosities has lessened over 
the years, chronic mistrust simmers in relations in Southeast Asia such as those 
between China and Vietnam, Thailand and Vietnam, Vietnam and Cambodia, 
and Cambodia and Thailand (Alagappa, 1998, pp.70, 111). Mutual suspicions 
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between Singapore and its two Malay neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia, are 
also considered undermining security cooperation within ASEAN (Acharya, 
1992, p.159).
3. Economic Development
Many analysts contend that the most important determinants of East Asian 
regionalism are economic factors. Peter Katzenstein argues that East Asian 
regionalism is “defined primarily in economic market terms” (Katzenstein, 1996, 
p.148). U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz also stated that “the 
name of the game in the [region] is economics” (Ball, 1996, p.36). Such remarks 
are hardly surprising since economic prosperity ranks high in the hierarchy of 
national goals in virtually all the East Asian countries. President Jiang Zemin 
addressed at the Fourteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party that success in economic development is a key element domestically and 
internationally (Jiang, 1992, p.16). Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Dy Nien also stated in 1990 that the world is now seeing “a primary interest 
in economic development” and “the strength of a country is measured mainly 
by its economic strength” (Ninh, 1998, p.456). In Indonesia, too, economic 
development is seen not only as an end in itself to increase prosperity and social 
welfare but also as a prerequisite for political stability (Anwar, 1998, p.487).
State interests in economic development militate both for and against 
regionalism. The idea that economic cooperation facilitates security cooperation 
is known as a ‘spill-over’ effect. The spill-over is a process in which cooperation 
in one area (e.g. economic realm) creates conditions favorable to cooperation in 
other areas (e.g. political realm). In East Asia, regional economic cooperation 
(e.g. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) had a spill-over effect in the security 
realm, establishing the ARF in 1994 (Ikenberry and Tsuchiyama, 2002, p.75; 
Kikuchi, 1995, p.281).
The preoccupation with economic development can also work to constrain 
progress of regional security cooperation. This was best illustrated in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Because of the crisis, defense 
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budgets were severely cut in many Southeast Asian countries, leading to 
cancellation of defense cooperation. For instance, the Thai Air Force cut its joint 
exercises with Malaysia and Singapore by more than half in 1998; Malaysia 
suspended its participation in exercises conducted under the Five Power 
Defense Arrangements (Ball, 1999, pp.7-8). The impact of the crisis was also 
considerable in Indonesia. Because of political, economic and social turmoil 
within the country, Indonesia lost its diplomatic leadership within ASEAN, 
culminating in the declining importance of ASEAN as a whole (Shiraishi, 2002, 
pp.3-40; Shuto, 2001, pp.21-52). The diminished leadership of ASEAN led to 
stagnation of the ARF. Regional countries had turned inward to deal with their 
national economic problems. 
4. Norms of Sovereignty and Domestic Non-Interference
Norms of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic non-
interference are by-products of the Westphalian state system. Sovereignty and 
non-intervention, coupled with the legal equality of states, have traditionally 
been considered as the three absolute norms specifying the “accepted and 
expected forms of behavior in relations between states” (Holsti, 1995, p.81). 
The norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention are enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations as key principles, constituting the basis of 
modern international law. Therefore, while there is nothing particularly ‘East 
Asian’ about these norms, they have growingly come to be viewed as “the 
long-cherished Asian principle[s]” (Liang, 1999). In fact, state sovereignty and 
domestic non-intervention have served as cardinal principles in cooperation 
within ASEAN (Yamakage, 2001, p.16).
The colonial experience of many East Asian countries drives them to 
strongly adhere to these norms. As already noted, throughout much of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were under constant subjugation by 
Western and Japanese imperial powers. Many countries, especially those in 
Southeast Asia, became what they are now only after the end of the Second 
World War. Even after independence, France continued to harass continental 
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Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) through the First Indochina 
War until the mid-1950s; and the U.S. until the end of the Vietnam War in 
1975. Because the state came into being as the champion of nationalist forces 
against the colonial oppression of the former Western great powers or Japanese 
imperialism, it is hardly surprising, as Hedley Bull stated, that they “cling to 
the rhetoric of sovereignty as one of the means available to defending it” (Bull, 
1984, pp.3-4). 
Adherence to the norms of sovereignty and domestic non-intervention often 
serve to constrain progress of regional security cooperation. As Desmond Ball 
points out, the security measures instituted thus far “do not impinge on core 
national interests—i.e., territorial claims and other sovereignty issues, defense 
capabilities and operations, or internal political processes”, all of which trespass 
on sovereignty and domestic non-intervention (Ball, 1997, p.16). Amitav 
Acharya goes a step further to argue that the primary objective of regionalism in 
East Asia has been the preservation of these norms:
Asian institutions have not taken the supranational path of the European 
Union. Instead, they have been sovereignty conforming....Asian norms and 
institutions were shaped by decolonization at a time when the main concern 
of regional actors was to preserve the modern nation-state as a permanent 
feature of the Asian political order....Asian multilateral conferences and 
institutions helped to embed the Westphalian norms of independence, 
reciprocity, equality, and non-interference within regional diplomatic and 
security practices. As a result, Asian regionalism, unlike its European 
variant, has not been transformative. Instead it has been conservative and 
norm preserving (Acharya, 2003/04, pp.158-9). 
5. Domestic Political Legitimacy
Domestic political legitimacy is closely associated with economic 
development and the norm of sovereignty because they are sources of the 
former. It relates to the right to rule the country with popular support. More 
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specifically, it is the degree of approval and support of the ruled for the ruler’s 
moral authority to issue commands and the people’s corresponding obligation to 
obey such commands. (Alagappa, 1995, p.29). 
The importance of domestic political legitimacy as a driving force of 
regional cooperation is discernible in East Asia, as it figures prominently in 
policy-making of many developing countries in the region. In Southeast Asia, 
internal stability and domestic political legitimacy was a major factor in shaping 
the nature and agenda of regional cooperation within ASEAN. The common 
threat of the ASEAN members in the 1960s stemmed from internal communist 
insurgencies. One of the salient incentives for the formation and development 
of ASEAN was that with the doctrine of non-interference in internal affairs of 
another, the members could concentrate on the management of threats posed 
by internal communist insurgencies so as to consolidate political legitimacy 
within their countries. In short, Southeast Asia countries viewed regionalism as 
a means to deal with internal security problems. Leifer characterized ASEAN 
as “collective internal security”: Regional partnership “will enable more 
effective individual attention to be paid to internal revolutionary challenge in an 
environment in which internal security is believed to be indivisible among the 
five states of the Association” (Leifer, 1989, p.1; 1980, p.6; Yamakage, 1997, 
p.327). 
Observing such development in Southeast Asia, Mohammed Ayoob argues, 
“successful regional cooperation is based primarily on the convergence of 
regime interests relating to internal security, especially the shared perceptions 
of internally generated threats to the security of states and the stability of 
regimes” (Ayoob, 1995, p.62). Similarly, Acharya contends that regime security 
is the main driving force of regionalism in the Third World (Acharya, 1992, 
pp.143-64). More recently, Shaun Narine has argued that “the most single 
important factor” in East Asian regionalism “is the concern of most East Asian 
states with domestic political legitimacy” (Narine, 2004, p.423). 
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III. The Level of State Development: A Sixth Factor?
The author would like to advance another factor, namely the level of state 
development. Three among the five factors (economic development, the norms 
of sovereignty and domestic non-interference, and domestic political legitimacy) 
discussed above are closely related to this variable. In this respect, the level of 
state development can be considered as their underlying factor. Why the level 
of state development? The proposition of this variable can be explained from 
a debate in theories of International Relations between neo-realism and neo-
liberalism, the two leading schools of thought on international cooperation.
The debate has suggested that the feasibility and dynamics of cooperation 
differs depending on a realm on which states cooperate. The debate posits that 
cooperation is extremely difficult in a military security field because it displays 
a zero-sum game where states cannot afford to let others gain relatively more 
than themselves since the relative gains of others may be fatal to their survival. 
Conversely, cooperation in a non-traditional security field is easier and sustainable 
because it displays a positive-sum game where all the participating states can 
gain and are less concerned about relative gains. This is why international 
cooperation is more likely in economic issue areas than in those concerning 
military security (Lipson, 1984, pp.1-23).
Regional cooperation in East Asia shows, however, that this is not 
necessarily the case. For example, in the area of sovereignty and territorial 
disputes in which the resolution of them will be zero-sum, while not much 
progress has been made between Japan and Russia over the Northern Territories 
or between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands, China and Russia reached 
an agreement in October 2004, resolving their decades-old Eastern border 
disputes. The dispute over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands between Malaysia and 
Indonesia was also solved through the ICJ in December 2002. Furthermore, 
although there have been little military confidence building measures or 
preventive diplomacy efforts between China and Taiwan or between China and 
the South China Sea disputing Southeast Asian countries, such measures have 
been in place between Japan and South Korea and between Japan and Russia. In 
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a non-traditional security area where positive-sum situations are likely created, 
on the other hand, whereas extensive efforts have been taken among Southeast 
Asian countries to secure energy (e.g., the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Project), 
little progress has been made to exploit crude oil and natural gas in the East and 
South China Seas.
These examples illustrate that the type of security problems—whether it is 
traditional or non-traditional—does not explain well the dynamics of East Asian 
regional security cooperation. Instead, they demonstrate that the willingness 
for cooperation varies from state to state. Some states are cooperative in both 
traditional and non-traditional security issues while others which are not 
cooperative in the military security area exhibit a similar negative attitude 
toward cooperation in the non-military security field. Showing a negative 
attitude toward regional cooperation, however, does not necessarily mean that 
the state is totally uncooperative; it can mean that its cooperation is limited. 
A possible explanatory variable that can account for the noted attitudinal 
differences is the level of state development. The argument is as follows: the 
stage of state development a state is in conditions the willingness of the state 
to cooperate. The more a state is developed, the more it is inclined for regional 
cooperation. The reason is two-fold. First, the process of state development is 
accompanied by the development of outward-looking policies. Second, high 
levels of economic and security interdependence and advanced transportation 
and communication systems obscure distinction between internal and external 
affairs, leading to the growing concurrence of national and regional/international 
interests. One important assumption here is that state preferences differ in 
accordance with the level of state development.
The level of state development as a factor in regional cooperation is not 
unsaid in a dense body of literature on regionalism. For example, Susumu 
Yamakage argues that two of the main obstacles to the deepening of cooperation 
within ASEAN, an association comprising countries whose level of state 
development is a lot more compatible with one another in comparison with 
that of states in such a larger region as East Asia, derive from the disparity in 
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economic development and the immaturity of political institutions (Yamakage, 
1997, p.180). Paul Evans also writes, “Latecomers to the process of state 
formation, few if any governments are willing to delegate sovereignty to larger 
political units. This sets limits on the scope and effectiveness of any kind of 
regional organization” (Evans, 2000, p.456). Tsutomu Kikuchi contends that 
because the process of state-building is still on-going in many parts of East Asia, 
international negotiation is strongly influenced by domestic policies (Kikuchi, 
1997, p.177). Nonetheless, the correlation between the level of state development 
and regionalism is rather made only in passing, and arguably the level of state 
development is often regarded as of secondary or tertiary importance. Most 
importantly, there are few studies that systematically examine the influence of 
this variable upon regionalism.
The term ‘state development’ used in this article carries a broader notion 
than state-building. State-building is a term that tends to be used with developing 
countries since the assumption is that the state is already built in developed 
countries. Francis Fukuyama defines state-building as “the creation of new 
government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones” (Fukuyama, 
2004, p.ix). State development, on the other hand, embraces state-building, but 
goes further to include a different notion. In recent years, there is an emerging 
(and growing) view that the role of the state is being reduced in certain areas in 
developed countries. As opposed to state-building, according to this view, the 
process of “state-reducing” is taking place in the latter states (Fukuyama, 2004, 
p.5). State development, in short, encompasses both state-building and state-
reducing. The term state development is preferable to state-building because East 
Asia is a region comprising both developing and developed countries, where the 
process of state-reducing may be more at work. 
It should also be noted that the notion of state development is less 
concerned with the type of political and economic systems. Although the 
differences in political and economic systems among countries have been 
raised as an impediment to regionalism in East Asia, a distinction should be 
made between the type and strength of political systems (Fukuyama, 2004, 
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pp.6-15). In this regard, political development is not necessarily equated with 
democratization.
As noted, developing countries, some of them are described as a weak 
state or a Third World country, are concerned primarily with the process of 
state-building. The principal distinguishing feature of these countries is their 
“high level of concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the 
government” (Buzan, 1991, p.99). For the first two decades of independence, 
for example, the Indonesian government was preoccupied with internal sources 
of insecurity such as Islamic insurgencies and communist coups d’état (Anwar, 
1998, p.489). Consequently, regional security issues are not the chief concern of 
developing countries. But, leaders of these states will become concerned about 
regional security issues if they are related to issues of state-building. Regional 
cooperation, hence, comes about when states perceive that their internal 
security and domestic political legitimacy are best preserved through inter-
state cooperation. “In much of the Third World in particular,” Louise Fawcett 
argues, “the tasks of nation-building, promoting political stability or economic 
development are of more immediate importance and indeed are prerequisites” to 
greater regional cooperation and integration (Fawcett, 1995, p.34). 
As states develop politically and economically, attention of national leaders 
goes beyond their national boundaries. In terms of security, internal stability 
allows security interests and concerns of the developing state to turn outward 
because its main threat to the state now comes from external. Put differently, the 
legitimate use of force that the developing state now monopolizes allows it to 
free individuals from what Hobbes labeled the ‘war of every man against every 
man’ domestically but serve as the basis for national defense at an international 
level (Fukuyama, 2004, p.1). Because border change by force is possible, a 
mutual recognition of state sovereignty and domestic non-intervention are 
important elements for national security of developing countries. 
The reorientation of ASEAN defense strategies and doctrines from counter-
insurgency warfare to conventional warfare capability in the late 1970s indicates 
not only the growing interests but also the affordability or capability (as a result 
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of improved domestic stability) of the ASEAN members to deal with issues that 
are not strictly confined within national boundaries. Moreover, the concepts of 
national resilience and regional resilience, which became the rallying cries for 
ASEAN, are in line with the outward development of state concerns. National 
resilience is an inward-looking concept, based on the proposition that national 
security lies not in military alliances with great powers, but in self-reliance 
deriving from domestic factors such as economic development, political 
stability, and a sense of nationalism. Former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali 
Alatas once said that “national resilience, if possessed by each country, could 
grow into regional resilience” (Alatas, 1996). The development from national to 
regional resilience signifies that the achievement of national resilience will allow 
governments to pay more attention to the outside world and provide them with 
latitude to cooperate with one another to create a better regional environment 
in order to sustain and enhance their security and economic growth (Acharya, 
2001, p.73).
Economically, too, states become increasingly outward-looking because 
the route to prosperity lies in international trade. Many countries, even socialist 
economies, now recognize that trade liberalization promotes economic 
prosperity. Long Yongtu, China’s vice minister of foreign trade, stated that 
“China’s economy must become a market economy in order to become part 
of the global economic system” (Lardy, 2002, p.21). In search of prosperity, 
states choose to interact with one another. As Robert Scalapino argues, “As 
an economy mature[s], it [is] essential to adopt new techniques to cope with 
increased labor costs, to devise methods of securing access to higher levels of 
technology, and to find means of discarding or drastically restructuring backward 
sectors with minimal social costs. Virtually all of these requirements demand 
greater internationalization, however strong the protectionist forces within the 
society” (Scalapino, 1994, p.47). 
Developed countries are in essence more cooperative for two reasons. 
First, marked increases in international economic interactions deepen the 
level of interdependence, especially among developed states. Because 
140 141
Weighing Influences
economic and security problems easily transmit to other countries as a result of 
interdependence, states find it more efficient and effective to prevent and solve 
them through cooperation than handle them individually. From a Deutschean 
perspective, increases in social communications and economic transactions also 
generate a sense of community among states, thereby promoting cooperation 
between them (Deutsch, 1957). Because it is much more profitable to expand 
economically than to conquer territory, developed states no longer harbor 
intentions of invading the territories of others (Cooper, 2003, p.39; Sørensen, 
2004, pp.122, 191; Tanaka, 2002, pp.160-161). Prosperity is best achieved 
through cooperation. Some regions, such as Europe and North America, have 
evolved into security communities, where the use of force as a way to settling 
disputes is rendered inconceivable (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Sørensen explicitly 
argues that a security community has replaced international anarchy in relations 
among the developed states (Sørensen, 2004, p.122).
Second, an increasing number of international interactions and the 
consequent international interdependence lead to the “increased sensitivity of 
domestic conditions to international events” (Morse, 1970, p.383). Because 
various political, economic and social interactions take place across societies in 
developed states, it becomes hard to draw a clear distinction between domestic 
and foreign affairs (Cooper, 2003, p.29; Morse, 1970, pp.374-7; Tanaka, 2002, 
pp.158-60). Globalization is a worldwide phenomenon and not distinctive 
of developed countries, but the dynamics of globalization are nowhere more 
profound. States and non-state actors conduct their activities domestically and 
internationally without much cost differences. Activities undertaken at the 
domestic level by states or non-state actors increasingly have consequences at the 
international level and vice versa. With increased influence of non-governmental 
actors, governments in the developed state no longer have full control over many 
of the activities occurring within its borders. In policy-making, be it domestic 
or foreign, a plethora of actors—businesses, interest groups, the public, the 
media, etc.—come into play; a dense web of policy networks hence emerges. 
Consequently, foreign and domestic policy in developed countries constitutes “a 
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seamless web” (Friedrich, 1966, p.97). Due to the breakdown of the distinction 
between internal and international issues, state interests of the developed state no 
longer remain ‘national;’ national interests increasingly come to coincide with 
regional and international interests. Given these two features, the motivation for 
regional cooperation is considered very high in developed countries.
If this argument is valid, the key actor in facilitating East Asian regional 
security cooperation would be developing countries, rather than developed, 
great powers as often suggested (Tow and Gray, 1995, pp.436-51). Because 
developing countries are in the midst of state-building processes, they attach 
great importance to economic development, the norms of sovereignty and 
domestic non-interference, and domestic political legitimacy. Developing 
countries would thus resort to regional cooperation under the following 
conditions: (1) it is fruitful to their economic growth; (2) it contributes to 
strengthen domestic political legitimacy; and (3) it does not impinge on their 
state sovereignty or interfere in their domestic affairs. Conversely, they will be 
averse to regionalism if it is viewed as detrimental to these values. 
IV. Conclusion
Regionalism in East Asia—Southeast Asia, in particular—can be 
understood as an exercise in state-building. This is because Southeast Asian 
countries constructed and have exploited a sub-regional framework named 
ASEAN as a hedge against external intervention to focus on their state-building 
processes (Yamakage, 1997, p.327). This still continues today. The establishment 
of the ARF is therefore a continued attempt by developing ASEAN countries 
to preserve a favorable environment to remain focused on state-building by 
maintaining peaceful engagement of great powers such as the U.S., China, and 
Japan to the region (Takano, 2003, p.83). In short, the ASEAN countries are 
seeking wider East Asian security in order to ensure Southeast Asian security, 
and not vice versa (Yamakage, 1997, p.308).
 In many works on regionalism, it is frequently the case that a compatible 
level of state development is either assumed or taken for granted. This is because 
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the study on regionalism has been built on the European experience, a region 
where major countries have roughly similar levels of development. As a result, 
one of the main assumptions is that regionalism, one scholar writes, occurs 
“only in countries of similar economic size and levels of industrialization, 
either between industrialized countries, or between developing countries, but 
not between industrialized and developing countries” (Weiss, 1999). In fact, 
there are few studies that systematically examine the influence of this factor on 
regionalism. The linkage between regionalism and the level of state development 
thus remains unfounded. It is possible that the level of state development is one 
of the most influential factors in East Asian regionalism. To serve as a useful 
policy guide to better promote regional security cooperation, it is imperative that 
scholars weigh the relative importance of various factors, including the level of 
state development. 
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東アジアにおける地域安全保障協力ないし地域主義の進展に影響を及ぼす要因は、
先行研究によって多数紹介された。しかし、どの要因がいなかる状況で最も強い影響
を与えうるのか、また、いかなる要因が最も当該地域の地域主義に重要な影響を及ぼ
しているのかといった問題については、必ずしも十分な研究が行われてこなかったの
ではないか。本論文は、それら諸要因の比較検討を行う必要性を訴えるものである。
比較検討の意義は 2点ある。1つは、国家の外交・安全保障政策には常に優先事項
があり、また政府の人的・物的資源も限られているため、多数の要因を列挙するだけ
では、政府が政策決定を行う際あまり有用な役割を果たさず、諸要因の影響力を比較
することによって、初めて実用的なものになるということである。もう 1つは、特に
影響力が強いと考えられる要因が明らかになれば、なぜそれ（ら）が重要なのかといっ
た、当該地域における地域主義の力学の理解を促すことに繋がるということである。
本論文は、様々な要因のうち、指摘される頻度が高く、特に重要と考えられている
5つを選択し紹介する。それらは、勢力均衡、歴史問題、経済発展、主権ならびに内
政不干渉原則、国内的政治正統性である。
また、本論文は第 6の要因として、後者 3つの要因（経済発展、規範、国内的政治
正統性）に関連する「国家発展（state development）レベルの差異」を挙げ、なぜこ
の要因が重要であるかを考察する。国家の発展レベルが高ければ高いほど、地域協力
に積極的な姿勢を示すという仮定の下に、本論文は、先進国が発展途上国より地域主
義に好意的である理由を 2点挙げる。第 1は、国家構築（state-building）プロセスが進
めば進むほど、国家の関心は国外へ向かうということに起因するものであり、第 2は、
経済的・安全保障的相互依存が深まると、国内問題と国際問題の境界線が不明瞭にな
るということに基づくものである。
東アジア地域主義と国家発展レベル
̶諸要因の比較検討の必要性̶
＜　要　約　＞
福田　保
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発展途上国は、国家構築が最優先事項であるため、経済発展、主権・内政不干渉規
範、政府の正統性といった、国家構築プロセスの根幹を構成する要素に非常に大きな
重きを置く。よって、発展途上国が地域協力に好意的になるか否かは、これらの要因
にいかに関連するかに左右される。
東アジアには日本のような先進国とインドネシアやマレーシアのような発展途上国
が共存する地域である。当該地域の安全保障協力は、発展途上国の国家発展プロセス
の成否に左右されるのではないだろうか。
